The readings of week six have shed light on the short comings of the Bush administration’s counter-terrorism prerogative which is a facet of “the war on terror” deployed by USAID and the United States intelligence agency throughout Africa. These discussions have most of their implicit in the notion of securing and accessing resources specifically throughout Africa. What is demonstrated throughout Hills’ article is much uncertainty revolving around the relationships of poor policing, under-development and extremism and the specifics of interconnectedness from one to the other. It is stated though that there is no concrete evidence supporting militant like police training, crime aiding technologies and counter terrorism measures lead to a decline in terrorist activity as well as violence domestic to the nation such as in Kenya. Kenya is used as an example, data retrieval (all though trivial at best) indicates Kenya still has crime that plagues the nation despite joint efforts with the United States to create an effective, legitimate police force that can eliminate terrorism and deal with arising supporters and extremists in a fair but extinguishing manor. Many problems have arisen with this continent wide mandate of counter-terrorism following 9/11, each being unique to the area it is immersed in as they have proven little effectiveness and are often received as intrusive, corrupt and not fulfilling immediate needs of citizens and governments essentially stripping these areas of autonomy and undermining legitimate authority. It is stated that the intervening efforts of troops and humanitarians have become blurred and sometimes NGO’s lend themselves vulnerable to political influence which has resulted on local strikes on NGO camps and personnel. Accompanying the narrative of terror employed by Bush’s admin after the events of 9/11 it becomes commonly acknowledged in these readings that security took great precedence over development initiatives by both aid agencies and the bodies servicing foreign policy for the state department and this is inclusive of Britain’s DFID by recent reforms emphasizing a securitizing efforts be taken in states of Africa. These policies were instituted in the name of global terror and threats pertaining to democracy but they were without deep speculation motives to secure resources and monitor populations as proxy surveillance wouldn’t suffice, while these goals in no way could be conceptualized as enhancements made to the millennium goals. Algeria is a nation that was also brought under the microscope to indicate collusion and deception stemming from the Bush government and Algerian officials who fabricated instances of terror in the region creating a fate for the country that as it was mentioned ironically allowed for terror in the region to become self-fulfilling prophecy creating instability which was already in continuance of the violence and catastrophe endured in the nation the decade prior. These examples and poor correlational attempts to link in isolation the implementation of counter-terrorism training with effective policing dissolving global terror induces the thought of a post colonial hegemonic presence contributing to animosity and corruption in African states with no true regard for citizens of the state under a primary legislative focus. The United States tends to extend its figurative tentacles wherever it may be tactical in securing resources and a military advantage and can unfortunately compromise genuine efforts and institutional stability as a bi-product. The coined “age of terror” has without doubt created new incentives for exploitation but does so in a manor that cloaks itself well with a seemingly convincing alibi in conjuncture with development and aid efforts. Unfortunately these are people’s lives that are being waged and left in the balance as these intervening tendencies perpetuate violence and create histories of catastrophe that might have been able to avoided if not contrived as the deceiving measures taken to secure the regions encompassed in the banana theory provide evidence of.
Although the public police seem accessible and willing are there any other levels of approach which might better address terror and crime that doesn’t leave middle actors subject to corruption and acting outside of the law? (Perhaps frameworks within transparency and education)
Would it be beneficial to Africa’s autonomy and unification to establish a body of oversight which examines foreign actors wishing to collaborate with specific states, would a democratic legislation prevent the mis-represented agendas of the foreign agent and even the domestic acting state as well?